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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Nuclear Power Plant Advisory Panel on Organizational Learning
provides channels of communication between the management and
organization research projects of the MIT International Program
for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety and plant personnel
actively concerned with important operational issues, inside and
outside the control room, relevant to safety. The Panel is
conceived as an opportunity for plants to share their knowledge
and concerns about aspects of management and organization, with a
particular emphasis on self-assessment, learning, and the
management of change. Further, the Panel seeks to identify
opportunities for collaborative research with practical benefits.
At the first Panel meeting, 20 representatives from U.S. nuclear
power plants and utilities and 14 MIT faculty, research staff,
and students explored mutual interests and priorities in order to
guide future research efforts. Professor John Carroll introduced
the overall MIT research project. Three MIT researchers
discussed their proposed research: Professor Alfred Marcus
discussed quantitative analyses of improvements in U.S. nuclear
power plant safety during the 1980s, and the need to conduct
detailed studies of plant improvements and of utility strategies;
Dr. Constance Perin discussed how work requires bridging across
functions, levels, technical groups, and shifts within a social
and cultural system, and proposed to study various plant programs
in terms of their vertical relationships and institutional
context; Professor John Carroll focused on the analysis of
safety-relevant incidents through the application of knowledge
distributed among various professional groups in the plant, and
the need for research to characterize this knowledge and its
relationship to performance enhancement. In addition, Professor
Michael Golay discussed the organization and management
implications of new reactor technology, and Professor Thomas
Kochan summarized research on contractor training and safety in
the petrochemical industry.
Roundtable groups discussed three topics of their own choosing:
configuration control, proactivity and communication with
management, and event trending (including root cause analysis and
corrective action tracking). A wide-ranging discussion explored
topics of mutual interest, their connections to safe operations
and their potential for research. A variety of research
opportunities were raised and discussed, along with next steps
for continued communication between.the Panel and MIT.

Organizational Learning at Nuclear Power Plants
John S. Carroll
Constance Perin
Alfred A. Marcus
Report of the Panel Meeting
Nuclear Power Plant Advisory Panel on Organizational Learning
MIT Sloan School of Management
Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 17-18, 1991
Background
The MIT Sloan School of Management is conducting a research
project on the management and organization of nuclear power
plants, with special emphasis on how plants can maximize their
abilities to learn from their own and others' experiences. This
project is part of the MIT International Program for Enhanced
Nuclear Power Plant Safety, a cooperative research effort
developed to create new knowledge relevant to enhanced safety,
which also includes research on the science and technology of
service and maintenance and the role of public policy. Unlike
other institutions concerned with safe performance, our interests
are in research, education, and technology transfer. Funded by
private utilities and foundations, we are in contact with but
receive no financial support from industry groups or government
agencies such as INPO, NRC, DOE, and IAEA. Current Program
sponsors are listed in Attachment 1.
The Nuclear Power Plant Advisory Panel on Organizational
Learning provides channels of communication between the MIT
research project and plant personnel actively concerned with
important operational issues (inside and outside the control
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room) relevant to safety. The Panel is conceived as an
opportunity for plants to share their knowledge and concerns
about aspects of management and organization, with a particular
emphasis on self-assessment, learning, and the management of
change. The Panel offers interested parties, who are dealing
with similar issues, a way to learn from one another and, in
conjunction with the MIT research program, to identify important
issues for research with practical benefits. Specific
collaborative research relationships among plants and the MIT
research team are on the Panel's agenda. Finally, MIT may be
able to offer support for research and change efforts that plants
may initiate.
In September, 1991, plants and utilities were invited to
send a representative to the initial Panel meeting at MIT on
October 17-18, 1991. The overall goal of meeting was to explore
mutual interests and priorities in order to guide future research
efforts. The preliminary agenda (see Attachment 2) was
structured to enable the MIT team to present their research
strategies and plans for discussion, and to invite plant
participants to raise and discuss their own issues and concerns.
A goal was to outline possibilities for collaborative research
for mutual benefit. Finally, another goal was to develop
specific next steps for the Panel in terms of the content,
frequency, and modes of its future communication.
Meeting Summary
The meeting began with introductions of 20 representatives
from U.S. nuclear power plants and utilities, 9 MIT faculty and
research staff, and 5 students. Attachment 3 provides a list of
the participants. Professor John Carroll next summarized the
objectives of the MIT Program on Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant
Safety as a whole and the Organization and Management Project
within the overall program. Each of the three principal MIT
researchers then discussed the rationale for research they
propose to conduct during the next 9 to 12 months. To provide
other stimulating examples for the Panel's discussions, two MIT
faculty presented reports, one on the organization and management
implications of new reactor technology, and the second on safety
implications of the use of contractors in the petrochemical
industry.
One objective of the Panel Meeting was to hear plant
representatives discuss how their own concerns and issues might
be introduced into the research projects. In addition to general
discussion and feedback about the MIT research projects, the MIT
research team suggested seven topics as possibilities for
Roundtable (break-out) discussions. Urged to suggest other
topics, the participants added three topics of their own
choosing: (a) configuration control, (b) proactivity and
communication with management, and (c) event trending, root cause
analysis, and corrective actions. A vote to determine the topics
of the Roundtables led to the choice of those proposed by
participants. Reports from each Roundtable were later presented
to the Meeting as a whole.
This report briefly summarizes the five presentations,
presents the issues raised by Panel participants during general
discussion and Roundtables, and closes with a summary of the
possibilities raised by the participants for continued Panel
activity and support for collaborative research.
Understanding Industry Improvement
Professor Alfred Marcus summarized his analyses of U.S.
nuclear power plant safety performance over time, using
quantitative data from NRC, FERC, and other sources. The
analyses show: (1) there has been continuous improvement in plant
performance on various safety indicators during 1985-89,
especially among below-average performers who are converging
toward the better performers; (2) separate safety indicators such
as SCRAMs, safety system actuations, and safety system failures
are only weakly related, so that the concept of a "safe" plant
must be carefully specified; (3) the strongest predictor of
significant event and safety system failure improvement was more
spending on the budget item of "Operations and Engineering
Supervision" per installed capacity from FERC reports. However,
.the meaning of this result depends on knowing which activities
are supported within this gross budget item. To investigate
this, Professor Marcus proposed focused case studies of several
plants that have made efforts to improve their safety records,
particularly within utilities that have plants with differing
performance records. Utility business strategy (e.g., whether
the utility is diversifying away from nuclear power) and
regulatory relationships were also related to improvement. Thus,
research must study utilities as well as plants, together with
characteristics of the industry such as national and state
regulatory relationships. For more detail, see Attachment 4.
Organizational Pathways Analysis
Dr. Constance Perin discussed a conceptualization of nuclear
power plants as continuous learning and vigilance systems.
Within plants, much of the work requires bridging across
functions, levels, technical systems, occupational groups, and
modes of operations (across shifts and tempos, in and out of
outage), as well as to external institutions (corporate,
regulators, utility commissions, vendors, contractors). Last
year's studies at several nuclear power plants examined how such
bridging integrates safety concerns across functions with an
emphasis on maintenance work requests. As reported in our 1991
Annual Report, the research methods included intensive
interviews, observation, and examination of documents on site.
Considerable variation in organizational forms exists across
different plants. This year, Dr. Perin proposes that we look at
how various "programs" such as outage planning and
implementation, fire prevention, and configuration control are
organized. These case studies will emphasize vertical
relationships and institutional context by mapping the
organizational pathways along which flow resources such as
people, information, rewards, and authority. The knowledge
gained will help develop deeper understandings of how plants
balance efficiency and safety, stability and change, and
proceduralization and training, negotiate the distribution of
responsibility and accountability, and maintain effective
learning. For more detail, see Attachment 5.
Making Sense of Plant Incidents
Professor John Carroll focused on the improvement of plant
functioning through the analysis of safety-relevant incidents,
which depends greatly upon the ability to interpret experience
from within and outside the plant. Over time, categories of
causes implicated in plant incidents have been grounded in
technical aspects and man-machine and training issues. Only
recently have the wider contexts of management and organization
been examined; the Human Performance Enhancement Program has this
broader focus. These categories constitute the knowledge or
"mental models" of- plant functioning necessary to understand and
learn from operating experience. Such models are socially-
distributed: no one person can know everything necessary about
the plant. Due to differences in professional training and plant
experience, different people will have different "mental models"
of operations. Effective interpretation and change management
requires the marshalling of these distributed partial models of
the plant. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a
feature of effective operations will be mental models that
individually and collectively diagnose problems effectively and
promote recovery. Prof. Carroll proposed a research project to
characterize the contents, depth, and distribution of mental
models in several plants, across functional and hierarchical
divisions, and the relationship between this distributed
knowledge and the capacity to learn, as reflected in safety
performance. Brief but interesting incident reports would be
selected and presented for analyses to a range of respondents in
each plant, thus revealing respondents' mental models in the
process of their use. For more detail, see Attachment 6.
Organizational and Managerial Issues in Advanced Nuclear Power
Plant Designs
Professor Michael Golay summarized the international efforts
to develop new technologies for performance improvements.
Although performance implies a combination of safety and
efficiency, new technologies tend to emphasize one or the other.
Worldwide programs of advanced reactor design are varied and
complex, yet the evaluation of these designs is dependent on the
regulatory climate. In the U.S., the NRC seems more comfortable
understanding the more evolutionary designs to improve economic
performance, and less certain of how to evaluate more
revolutionary designs for enhanced safety (e.g., passive safety).
As a result, the safety-centered designs are receiving less
support. Further, no one seems to be considering the
implications of advanced reactor designs for organization and
management, other than to create "hands off" designs with limited
roles for people. For more details, see Attachment 7.
Safety. Contractors, and Training in the Petrochemical Industry
Professor Thomas Kochan summarized an OSHA-sponsored study
of safety and health issues relating to the use of contract labor
in the U.S. petrochemical industry. Surveys of plant managers,
direct hire and contract workers, contracting firms, and case
studies of 9 plants revealed a lack of injury and incident data
about the experiences of contract workers, a high and growing
prevalence of contract workers, contract workers who are less
experienced and lower paid than direct-hire workers, a lack of
safety consideration in contractor selection, less training of
contract workers despite their involvement in some of the more
risky work, and a lack of plant management oversight of contract
workers due partly to avoidance of legal and financial
responsibility over contract workers. Most importantly, contract
workers were more likely to experience accidents than direct
hires; lack of training and communication of safety practices was
implicated as a predictor of safety problems. For more details,
see Attachment 8.
Issues and Concerns Raised
Discussion ranged over a wide variety of topics. The
following list gives a flavor of the most frequent concerns. The
following issues do not represent a consensus or prioritized
ordering; these are opinions expressed by individuals and
discussed by the group. There were considerable differences in
whether particular plants were experiencing these as concerns.
Of course, the categories and relationships among these issues
could be elaborated in many ways.
1) Conflicting Demands for Error-Free and Efficient
Operations -- Nuclear power plants are expected to be "high-
reliability" organizations, a category that includes air traffic
control, aircraft carriers, and blood banks. Such organizations
must try hard never to make serious errors, and to extract as
much information as possible from each incident. Plants must
quickly recover from and learn from small mistakes so they do not
become big ones. The post-TMI period had intense attention to
safety improvement from the public, regulators, etc. However,
many utilities are reorganizing around a concern for cost
reduction and competitiveness.
2) Communicating with Upper Management -- It is often
difficult to get management attention, especially about "soft"
people issues that do not fit into a task-oriented paradigm.
There is a need to establish the credibility of those low in the
organization or in the wrong parts of the organization. There
are bottlenecks in the upward flow of information where the
hierarchy is too strong. The MIT research could provide
independent, objective corroboration of things that have
difficulty being heard. Management should be more proactive and
concerned with the long term, rather than reacting to immediate
pressures from the NRC. Management should better communicate
expectations about quality work and fill in the big picture,
especially about jobs being on the line with respect to business
performance. There is a disjunction between the cooperative
system expected of employees and the command system that relates
downward. Budgeting and allocating resources is a concrete way
management communicates, but plant personnel are not involved.
3) Lowering the Threshhold of Self-Reporting -- Few "near
miss" reports are turned in, yet these are very valuable for
finding things before problems become more serious. In other
countries, the craft are taken more seriously and participate
more in reporting and fixing problems. The bottom of the
organization knows a lot that is not reported because of a
tendency to blame individuals, lack of confidentiality, sense of
not being listened to because they are low status, or lack of
follow-through (no feedback or follow-up actions). There is
tension between the tendency to blame and punish, and the need to
maintain a learning environment that addresses broader system-
wide problems.
4) Coding, Interpreting, and Trending Incidents -- Several
plants reported inconsistencies in coding systems, or difficulty
coding some classes of information. Symptoms are more easily
coded than causes, and symptoms tend to be the focus of mandated
reporting. Since incidents such as mispositionings may have very
different causes, what then is a "repeat"? Panel participants
agreed that incident reviewers are looking beyond "personnel
error" to the larger context, and that they have to gain skill in
doing so. It is hard to evaluate the resulting information
because there are few standards other than past performance --
how can a plant know how it's doing against other plants or know
how good is "good enough"? What models are there for
understanding combinations of performance indicators? Also,
corrective actions should be trended as well as events and
causes.
5) Structuring Incident Analysis -- Some plants centralize
incident analysis in one person or a dedicated group of
evaluators (e.g., HPES program) who become expert. Others
decentralize analysis and include those (e.g., foremen) who know
more of the details, thereby spreading analytical knowledge
through the plant and easing the way for implementing change.
Should HPES analysis be more integrated with other problem
solving activities (e.g., event analysis), and more widely
disseminated into routine considerations, or should it be
reserved for special circumstances?
6) Learning in Nuclear Power Plants -- How can learning be
carried out in "trial and error" fashion given the great amount
of public exposure and intensive scrutiny of all errors by
outside parties? How can we avoid a "cover-up" or "blame" or
"kill the messenger" mentality in such a setting? How to quickly
recover from and learn from small mistakes so they do not become
big ones? Are there other organizational analogies - aircraft
carriers, blood banks, chemical plants, air traffic controllers?
Imitating practices of others may have no bearing at different
sites with customized features; can there be one best way of
managing?
7) Motivation and Procedures -- The procedures and work
preparation process is so complex and frustrating that people
bypass the process. Occasionally they get caught. Additional
procedures undermine individual ability. Too much detail may be
given in places where it is not needed, and too little where it
matters. Handoffs of procedure-writing to contractors may create
mismatches and miscommunications. Even with good procedures, how
can we move from a rule-bound mode to one of active thinking
where training and professional expertise play as much of a role
as mindless verbatim compliance with procedures?
8) Locating Expertise and Responsibility -- There should be
ownership and expertise, but the challenges should be
proportional to training to avoid anxiety or boredom. Systems
engineers may be one important location for responsibility over
systems, if they are given budget authority. Job enrichment and
rotation can overcome boredom, maintain vigilance, and provide
training. However, job rotation should not take away experienced
people with training who have finally gained competence and
become indispensible to a function. There is need for additional
operators on shift so they can be out in the plant touring,
observing, inspecting, and talking with others on roving watch.
Such a resource commitment would be one example of management's
proactive attitude.
9) Safety vs. Cost -- There are conflicts between safety and
cost (incluoing the external forces of NRC pushing safety while
PUCs keep costs down). What incentives work during outages to
meet schedules? Are these the right ones to enhance safety? How
can we achieve both schedule and safety goals? Some plants have
bonus systems that extend to all employees, involving sets of
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performance and safety goals that are negotiated with each group.
The goals from which bonuses are computed may differ from group
to group, but come from a single pool of bonus money for the
plant.
10) Proactivity vs. Reactivity -- Reacting to problems gives
a sense of accomplishment and problem-solving, and is also
exciting. This behavior fits the stereotype of operators as
enjoying crises. Proactivity is thinking rather than doing; it
feels like creating problems rather than solving them. Thus,
despite broad agreement about the importance of being proactive,
there are some emotional blocks (and manpower limiations) that
inhibit these behaviors.
Prospects for Further Collaboration and Panel Activity
There was considerable formal and informal discussion of
research opportunities that address the foregoing concerns and
issues. Several plant representatives volunteered to invite us
to conduct studies of their plants. For example, some plants
have recently begun organizational changes; one plant is about to
conduct a plant-wide self-assessment. These opportunities will
be considered in the context of the overall research effort.
A variety of data sources was discussed -- information
gathered by the plants on incidents, performance, worker
suggestions and information requests, maintenance work requests,
personnel, and so forth. Participants seemed willing to have MIT
study such data within the constraints of confidentiality. The
research team was also interested in the narrative of incidents
from which category coding is made for summary reports.
It was suggested that the Panel and MIT work toward more
informative incident report categories. The Panel might create a
pool of reports for us. Also, alternatives to traditional
methods of corrective action and organizational change were of
interest. The theme of "buy-in" resurfaced with interest in ways
to get more commitment from upper management and workers.
The MIT team offered technical assistance for Panel members
who might wish to conduct their own research in plants. For
example, they might hold discussion sessions about incidents and
recovery activities with supervisor-level workers. The MIT
researchers also suggested that the Panel could send memos to MIT
and to each other about topics or issues they find salient.
The Panel consensus was to continue to work and to meet
again in nine to twelve months, in order to avoid conflict with
workshops scheduled by INPO for HPES Coordinators. Other
contacts via telephone, mail, and fax are likely.
Next SteDs
The Panel first asked the MIT research team to issue a
report or proceedings of the Panel meeting for general
distribution, as rapidly as possible. To ensure accuracy and
confidentiality of particular statements about plant incidents
and performance, a preliminary version of the report is to be
sent out for comment to all Panel participants before release as
an MIT Center for Energy Policy Research report.
The MIT research team will also distribute a draft of a
questionnaire inquiring about the kinds of data relevant to the
project that are already kept by plants. Panel members will
provide brief descriptions and examples of this data (concealing
personal and plant identities), as well as judgments of its
usefulness and availability for research.
The MIT research team will identify the kinds of research
sites most desirable for each of the studies planned for the
coming months. Panel members may be contacted; specific
negotiations for collaborative research will follow dissemination
of the Meeting report to plants and utilities.
Panel members are encouraged to communicate any follow-up
thoughts prompted by the meeting to the MIT team. Further
expressions of interest in research or sponsorship of the MIT
Program are welcome.
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Attachment 2 - Advisory Panel Agenda
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17
8:15 Coffee and rolls, Penthouse of 38 Memorial Drive (E56)
8:30 Introductions
* Goals of the meeting
* Discussion of two-day agenda
* Brief overview of MIT research program
9:30 MIT collaborative research directions
* Alfred Marcus, "Understanding Industry Improvement"
* Constance Perin, "Organizational Pathways Analyses"
* John Carroll, "Making Sense of Plant Incidents"
10:30 Break, beverages
11:00 Discussion
* Panel concerns, issues
* Panel response to MIT research program
12:00 Lunch
1:15 Roundtable discussions (three of the following topics)
1. Outage planning and scheduling
2. Coordinating operations and maintenance
3. Corrective action tracking
4. Procedure reliability
5. Contractor training
6. ALARA planning
7. Fire prevention
3:00 Break, change rooms to E40-170, beverages
3:30 Roundtable reports and discussion
5:30 Cash bar at Faculty Club (6th floor of 50 Memorial Drive)
6:30 Dinner in the Penthouse at 38 Memorial Drive (E56)
7:30 After-dinner presentation and discussion
Michael Golay, Professor of Nuclear Engineering
"Organizational and Managerial Issues in
Advanced Nuclear Power Plant Designs"
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18
8:30 Coffee and rolls, Penthouse of 38 Memorial Drive (E56)
8:45 Presentation and discussion
Thomas A. Kochan, George Maverick Bunker Professor of
Management, "Safety, Contractors, and Training
in the Petrochemical Industry"
10:30 Break, beverages
11:00 Discussion led by the MIT Research Team
"Ways of Thinking About Organizations: The Social
and Cultural Logics of Nuclear Power Plants"
12:30 Wrap-up and action points
1:00 End of meeting (MIT team will stay as late as anyone
wishes to continue discussion)
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ATTACHMENT 4
October NPP Advisory Panel on Organizational Learning
"Understanding Industry improvement"
Alfred A. Marcus
Research Plans and Rationale 1991-92
Understanding Performance improvement
The research proposed here would concentrate on understanding improvement
in nuclear power plant performance. Indeed, 1985-90 trends in the industry,
based on published reports, were good. Plants operating at a high level
generally maintained their high level of performance, and improvements were
achieved at plants that previously had poor records (See Figures 1-2).
*What accounts for continued high level of performance at the
"excellent" plants? What guarantees that these excellent plants
will to continue to perform at the same level? What signs would
indicate that they were headed for trouble?
*How have some plants been able to make turnarounds in their
performance? What accounts for their improved performance? How
have the turnarounds been achieved?
*What about plants that have tried to improve, but have not
been able to accomplish as much as they hoped? What accounts
for their inability to achieve what they want?
Last Years Statistical Studies
Last years statistical studies were based on a model of improvement at
nuclear power plants (See Figure 3) which presumes that future performance
on an indicator is best explained by past performance on that indicator.
Improvement only occurs if problems are recognized, resources are available
for problem solving, these resources are appropriately applied, and the
utility's attention is focused on nuclear power and is not distracted by other
strategic thrusts and initiatives. Alternative variables representing the
Figure 1
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concepts in the theory were used to validate the theory. Predictive models
were developed using Poisson regression.
The central concepts of the theory appeared to be valid:
*Past performance predicted future performance.
*Plant performance was affected by utility-level factors, e.g.:
-- Spending on operations supervision and engineering predicted
improvements in safety system failures and significant events.
-- Investment in other generating capacity predicted- declines in
safety system failure and significant event performance.
Research Plan
This years research plan would be as follows:
1. Continue Statistical Studies. Last years analyses would be wrapped
up with attempts at publication, as new work is initiated. The data base
will be expanded and leads pursued which were considered before, but for
which there was no time to complete. For instance, work on measuring
performance with PRA data could be undertaken, or new performance
measures could be developed that take safety and productivity into account
at the same time. A special focus may be the effects of PUC policies. What
impact do they have on nuclear power plants?
2. Initiate Case Studies. The idea would be to devise careful case
comparisons, for example to look at utilities that are similar in most respects
but which have sets of plants performing at different levels. What accounts
for the differences? Moreover, how have utilities attempted to transfer their
competencies from plant to plant?
3. Begin to think about the broader implications of the work -- the
distinct characteristics of nuclear power plant organization and management
and how it compares with other types of organization and management.
Significance of Work
This focus on performance raises many important questions:
1.The Meaning of performance. What exactly is meant by performance
in the industry? Are the published statistics adequate? How do personnel on
the spot know that they are doing OK? How do they know that their
performance is getting better?
2.The Nature of Nuclear Power Plant Organization and Management:
Does It Differ From Other Types of Organization and Management? People in
the nuclear power industry, NRC, and elsewhere agree that management and
organization contributes to the successful operation of nuclear power plants.
However, the broad issue of what nuclear power organization and
management is, and how it differs from managing other technologies has not
been adequately settled.
*What are the special characteristics of organizing and managing
a nuclear power plant that make it different, for example, from
managing a bank, a university, a hospital, a chemical plant, a
military brigade, or an automobile factory?
*Does nuclear power organization and management differ from
organization and management generally?
These issues cannot be resolved without taking a fresh look at nuclear
power plant organization and management based on careful observation of
what managers do. Comparison with other technologies then is possible as is
placing nuclear power organization and management in the framework of
organization theory more generally.
Characteristics That Set Nuclear Power Plants Apart. Some of the
characteristics that seem to set nuclear power plants apart include (see
Figure 4):
1. An extensive reliance on rules, externally imposed by the
NRC, which are matched by a high degree of internal
proceduralization.
2.Cycles of management attention and activity highlighted by the
outage planning process.
3. The burden on personnel in nuclear power plants to be
strong problem solvers.
4. The need to learn from errors and mistakes.
These activities are carried out in a context in which the factors in Figure 4
play an important role.
Figure 4
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Constance Perin
Organizational Pathways Analyses: Overview
Case studies comparing at least two plants will furnish information
about how work gets done in several complex programs, from the plant
floor to corporate offices. The programs to be studied are Outage
Scheduling and Implementation, Fire Prevention, Procedure Revision,
and Operations and Maintenance Coordination. These cases will map
the organizational pathways in both directions between the actors in
these complex programs, and, as possible, under different plant
conditions (e.g., online and in outage). The maps will identify the paths
travelled by human and technical resources of all kinds and specify the
points at which actors discuss their options and constraints.
The cases will help us to learn how conflicts are negotiated and
scarcity dealt with, how industry and regulator rules are helpful and
restrictive, how influence and authority are exercised, and how these
processes draw on the distributed knowledge of plant and corporate staff.
The cases will provide a source of data with which we can begin to
characterize the nature of organizational and managerial strategies and
processes that enhance safe performance.
With these case studies in one kind of high reliability organization,
we will begin to understand the operations of social and cultural
authority systems as they intersect with complex technological systems.
How are explicit, institutionalized authority systems both followed and
challenged and how are less explicit but no less institutionalized
normative and value systems followed and contested? Along this
continuum of acquiescence and challenge are revealed processes of
negotiation with both ends of the continuum.
These negotiating processes in practice form the backdrops to any
of our attempts to leverage our findings into helpful concepts and tools
for organizational learning. That is, how these processes play out form
the dynamics that underlie each plant's organizational and managerial
systems. How can we discover the properties of these processes and
characterize them? Moreover, these processes are at the same time
defining the contents of mental models of plant operations and how
employees see their constraints and options during critical moments of
diagnosis and recovery.
Organizational Pathways Analyses
Last year, we concentrated on comparing how plants integrate safety
concerns into their operations by focusing on cross-functional
relationships (e.g., maintenance work requests). This year, we're looking
at several "programs," to learn how top management plans them and how
they get implemented (e.g., outage planning, fire prevention). These
studies will help us develop an understanding of how work gets defined
and done, all the way from corporate offices to the plant floor. Last
year, we were concerned with lateral relationships, this year, we'll deepen
the picture by adding vertical relationships within the utility and, going
even further, the institutional context that is so central to utilities' safety
programs.
We conceptualize nuclear power plants as continuous learning and
vigilance systems, drawing cautions and lessons from external and
internal incidents and events. We assume that plants have permeable
boundaries: Two-way communication with corporate headquarters,
industry groups, regulator, vendors, contractors, local community,
Congress. Within plants, we assume that much of the work consists of
bridging the interstices between plant and corporate, between corporate
and regulators, and between functions, levels, suppliers, and technical
systems. This bridging work represents concretely the operational.
necessity for interdependence and cooperation. Especially when there are
incidents, the effectiveness of these bridging processes are called into
question.
At the same time, responsibilities and accountabilities are assigned
between corporate and plant and throughout the plant's organization.
Some of these assignments are self-defined by utility leaders, some are
required by the regulators. Organizational forms differ across nuclear
power plants.
To develop data with which to understand these dynamics and
differences better, we are planning case studies of programs for outage
planning, fire prevention, and procedure reliability in two plants (we'd do
more if we had more resources).
What we plan to do
Through interviews and observations, we will map the pathways in both
directions between the main actors in such programs and document the
various resources being sent and received along these organizational
channels. These maps will show what blocks the paths, what facilitates
movement along them in both directions, and how differences in
priorities, in technical judgment, in experiences are negotiated. The
"resources" travelling along these pathways consist of people, money,
technology, information, rewards, sanctions, management "styles," and
values. Our data will consist largely of the ways in which actors define
and discuss their options and constraints.
What we expect to learn
To manage resources and priorities requires at the same time managing
differences in opinion, in experience, in interests. How these are
negotiated and how scarcity is optimized adds up to "management style."
a) We will learn how management defines these resources, how
they go about allocating them, and how these complex programs are
implemented. We will learn how accountabilities are defined and
delegated, how vetoes are exercised, how problem-ownership is handled,
how distributed knowledge is drawn upon, how organizational slack is
allocated, and how consensus is built.
b) We will learn how the institutional framework influences the
shape and flow of resources. How do NRC regulations and reporting
requirements facilitate or hinder them? How do public utility
commissions influence management practices? -How do SALP and INPO
assessments enter into allocations and priorities? These are all significant
parts of this story.
c) We will learn how new information is brought into these
channels -- for example, industry experience and plant incident reviews.
We will learn how the organization evaluates, adapts, and integrates new
information -- that is, how it learns.
Why these questions are significant
These studies will develop information that will help us to develop tools
for self-analysis and self-design for plants to consider using. The studies
will provide a basis for characterizing the nature of organizational and
managerial strategies and processes that enhance safe performance.
Plant organizations can consider how their situations compare.
More generally, these studies of nuclear power plants will add to
new knowledge being developed about high reliability organizations and
their differences from other kinds of large, complex organizations.
Similar issues arise in the petrochemical industry and on aircraft carriers,
for example: How do social and cultural systems intersect with complex
technological systems? How are explicit regulations followed and
challenged? How are less explicit social conventions, traditions, and
customs followed and contested? How are differences in knowledge,
expertise, experience, and rank negotiated? Not only are these important
processes for managing, but they also do much to define how employees
up and down the chain of command see their constraints and options
during critical moments of diagnosis and recovery.
These negotiating processes form the backdrops to any of our
attempts to leverage our findings into helpful concepts and tools for
learning in high reliability organizations. That is, how these processes
play out form the dynamics that underlie organizational and managerial
systems. Any tools we develop specifically for nuclear power plants will
have to acknowledge these processes, if plant managers are to find our
suggestions credible.
Further, if we are to suggest organizational structures appropriate
to high reliability organizations, we must also understand these dynamics
in order to envision how such changes would affect them, for the better
or for the worse. For nuclear power plants in particular, we assume
that many of the current organizational structures are in place because of
the nature of the production process.
Summary
Our studies suggest that the ways in which the complex programs we
want to study are organized and managed, up and down the chain of
responsibility and accountability, will provide a window into generic
issues. We assume that how these are resolved will have some bearing on
safe performance, directly or indirectly. We do not believe that there is a
single ideal way for utilities to deal with these complex domains. We
intend these case studies to lead instead to deeper understandings of
operating and institutional dynamics as they align with organizational
and managerial processes.
We will select programs such as outage planning not because they
are error prone, but because they represent especially complex sets of
activities that carry a high burden for overall safe performance. Those
we study put especially complicated demands on utility management to
develop and implement policies that
--balance between efficiency and safety,
--balance between organizational stability and change,
--distribute responsibility and accountability,
--evaluate the relative importance of experience, judgment, and
technical data, and
--maintain an effective learning curve.
They also are likely to be especially informative about ways that
regulatory oversight, vendor relationships, and contractor support
facilitate and hinder organizational and managerial strategies and choices
for maximizing safe plant performance.
We will be interviewing executives, managers, supervisors,
engineers, operators, craftspeople, and technicians at corporate, station,
and plant levels. We will supplement these interviews with appropriate
archival materials from individual utilities, industry groups and
regulators as well as with the findings of other studies.
Ideally, we hope that these cases will allow us to develop
alternative scenarios for organizing and managing. We ultimately would
like to evaluate their effectiveness by conducting demonstration or pilot
programs with cooperating utilities.
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October NPP Advisory Panel on Organizational Learning
"Making Sense of Plant Incidents"
John S. Carroll
Research Plans and Rationale for 1991-2
The nuclear power industry focuses extraordinary attention
on safety-related incidents. Individuals and committees within
plants and organizations in industry and government work very
hard to gather and interpret information. Thus,. the improvement
of plant functioning and the enhancement of safe performance
depend greatly upon the ability to interpret experience from
within and outside the plant. And, this ability derives from
knowledge and expertise, the "cognitive capital" distributed
through the organization, and throughout the industry.
Causal Analysis
One major strategy for learning from experience is to
identify the causes of safety-relevant incidents, in order to fix
problems and learn more general lessons. Exemplary efforts to
determine causes include plant committees formed to analyze
events, HPES incident analysis reports, SALP reports, ASSET
missions from the IAEA, and so forth.
For decades, the concern over the consequences of hazardous
technologies was conceptualized primarily as a technical problem.
When concern extended beyond the technical system to the human
operators, maintainers, and designers who are essential to the
safe functioning of the technical system, the convention was to
examine the immediate interface of people and technology -- look
for an incompetent or inattentive individual or a confusing set
of controls and indicators. These approaches have been
demonstrably successful in improving safety and other aspects of
effective performance.
What seems to be missing is to have as much detail about the
managerial, social and cultural systems in organizations as we
have about technical systems and individual human error (see
Figure 1). Even sophisticated analyses that separate slips,
lapses, mistakes, and violations lack categories other than
individual intentions for understanding the sources of human
error.
For example, TMI involved a stuck valve and operator
misunderstanding, but also inadequate instrumentation, incorrect
procedures and training, and failure to transmit information
within the industry about this type of event. For each of these
contributing causes, there were previous causes or conditions
including design flaws, surveillance errors, outdated procedures
and training, improper staffing for key domains of expertise, and
so forth. Behind these conditions is the strategic direction and
allocation of resources in utilities and the structure of the
industry and regulators that inhibited the free flow of*
information.
In principle, such causal analysis can be endlessly
extended, far beyond the point of being in the service of safe
performance. As the head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency Incident Reporting-System writes, "the root cause must be
a cause that we have the power to deal with and solutions can be
Figure 1
WHAT'S MISSING?
More detail about certain types of causes:
communication, authority
social relationships
cultural meanings
conflicting goals/incentives
extra-plant institutions
More understanding about causes:
combinations of causes
dynamic relationships over time
redefining "root" cause
More understanding of the analysis process:
causes as the product of analysis
the importance of interpretive skills
social distribution of knowledge
absurd if not limited" (Tolstykh, 1991). By limited, he means
within our control and consistent with other objectives (e.g.,
produce energy economically).
In contrast, HPES reports adopt the viewpoint that incidents
are analyzed in order to promote discussion and understanding of
the plant, not to find "the (single) root cause" of a problem.
Issues are chosen for consideration because they are puzzling to
an operational manager. The HPES analyses raise multiple points
of attack to improve plant functioning, but the goal is to
increase the ability of the plant to make effective changes,
rather than to fix any one thing. Our approach to nuclear power
plants as "learning organizations" shares this viewpoint.
Mental Models
In this spirit, we suggest that the underlying resource that
is utilized in incident analyses, and is also the product of such
analyses (considered as learning experiences), is plant
employees' own understanding and interpretation of operational
experience (see Figure 2). This is socially-distributed
knowledge: no one person can know everything necessary about the
plant. Due to differences in professional training and plant
experience, different people will have different "mental models"
of the plant. Effective interpretation and change management
requires the marshalling of these distributed partial models of
the plant. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a
feature of "good" plants will be mental models that individually
and collectively diagnose problems effectively.
Figure
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For the most part, "mental models" of the plant are
implicit. They are rarely discussed or formally presented. They
emerge as the foundation of the interpretive work that occurs
around problems, incidents, or issues that create surprise,
concern, or a need to know more. In short, mental models are
revealed as they are used. As people in the plant discuss and
analyze such issues together, they are exposed to each others'
mental models, and each person's own models becomes more general,
more comprehensive, and more consistent and closely linked with
others' models.
Research Proposal
We propose to develop a way to understand better these
interpretive and learning processes. The overall approach would
be to select some interesting examples or scenarios from actual
situations in plants, and to present these to employees in
different occupations, across a range of plants, for their
reactions. In so doing, they would be exercising their "mental
models."
One interesting sample scenario was sent to us by an HPES
Coordinator. The Coordinator thought that the situation demanded
more analysis than simply stating "the root cause is personnel
error." This scenario is quite short:
During the inspection of [] Turbine Building ground floor,
two caged maintenance storage areas in the northwest corner
were found to contain significant housekeeping and fire
hazard control deficiencies in violation of ACP 2.05B.
These deficiencies included: an unrestrained gas cylinder,
improper storage of an oxy-acetylene unit, improper storage
of flammable materials, improper disposal of combustible and
inflammable materials, impeded access to fire system valve,
storage of significant combustibles directly underneath
cable trays, and general poor housekeeping.
We would ask for reactions to this situation using questions
such as the following:
(a) Please give as many implications as you can think of
regarding the causes and conditions that underly this
situation;
(b) What would you do to find out more about this situation and
its causes;
(c) What, if anything, would happen in your plant following such
a situation;,
(d) Give as many recommendations as you can for things to do in
response to this situation.
Two reasonable hypotheses about the capacity of a plant to
learn from experience readily emerge from our framework: First,
the variety and depth of sophistication of the analyses produced
by plant personnel should be important to learning. By "depth,"
the hypothesis refers to more system-based and temporally-complex
causes rather than simple human error, poor training, etc.
Second, the overlap of analyses across functions and levels of
plant personnel should be an indicator of the ability to
communicate about incidents. The overlap is likely to index a
past history of shared problem-solving among a wide range of
plant personnel. The need for variety and shared knowledge
suggests that specialization of plant personnel into zones of
expertise can be overdone, with an attendant difficulty in
working together to address complex problems that cut across
areas of specialization.
Throughout this research, we will maintain strict
confidentiality regarding: (a) the plant location of the various
materials, by removing all identifying information; and (b) the
plant location and individual identities of the respondents.
Goals and Products
There are several practical purposes for conducting this
research project, and the results will be usable in several ways.
First, we will be able to characterize the kinds.of understanding
that plant personnel have regarding why things happen and how
problems emerge and get solved. It is important to determine
whether attention does get directed toward technical issues and
individual human error, or whether there is widespread
understanding of more systemic, social, and cultural processes.
An understanding of the language and categories used to
understand plant operations seems essential for characterizing
what is or is not a "safety culture" and bridging the gaps
between plants and researchers.
Second, we can examine the distribution of categories and
language in these "mental models" across functional areas and
hierarchical levels in plants (and utilities). Knowledge is
distributed within plants, but some plants are more highly
specialized and compartmentalized than others. How different are
plants in the ways that knowledge is distributed? What kinds of
knowledge or viewpoints on the plant are held by different
segments of the organization? Does a more widely-shared set of
mental models suggest that communication across functional and
hierarchical boundaries has been more effective?
Third, it is reasonable to assume that the long-term safe
performance of plants, in particular the ability to learn and
improve, is related to the capacity to analyze experience, as
characterized in this study. We might expect that more volume
and variety of analysis, and more attention to systemic, social,
and cultural factors, will be associated with safe performance.
Further, the overlaps across boundaries should reflect the
ability to communicate and share expertise about plant incidents.
This should lead to some suggestions regarding ways to enhance
the learning capacity of nuclear power plants.
Finally, the study of incident analysis will help us better
understand the nature of nuclear power plants as "self-designing
organizations" (see Figure 3). In an environmental context of
demands for safety and new technologies and regulations, nuclear
power plants are continually challenged to adapt and innovate.
In this context, "compliance" is not a sufficient concept to
express the attitudes and values that lead to safe performance.
Instead, there must be attention and resources given to the self-
design process that depends on the involvement of a broad range
Figure 3
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Compliance Isn't Enough
* Commitment and vigilance
* Creativity
* Can't get complacent
Management Consulting Isn't Enough
* Beyond "best practices"
* Organizations have the responsibility
* Enhanced skills and "mental models"
Strengthening the. Self-Design Process
* Perception and diagnosis
* Creativity and understanding
* Implementation
of employees.
Discussion Points
To carry out this project, we need advice from the Panel on
the following issues:
1. Does our understanding of incident interpretations match up
to your own ideas and experiences? How can we improve and
deepen the way we conceptualize the problem?
2. How should we select issues and incidents to which plant
personnel will respond? What dimensions should these have,
such as interest, surprise, modest length, ability to be
understood across different plants, etc.? We thought that
we would ask the Panel to provide actual situations (without
revealing plant identities), and then help us to select a
small number that seem the best. We could also seek
examples from Lifted Leads stories and INPO training
materials.
3. How should we select respondents within a plant? We want to
get a range of respondents from different functional areas
and different hierarchical levels, yet we must keep the
overall number of respondents manageable. How can we create
a representative group of plant employees who will be asked
to respond to the issues and incidents?
4. How do we design the materials to be clear and self-
administering? In what form should we solicit replies -
open-ended questions or rating scales/checklists? How do we
ensure a high response rate? How much time will people b.e
willing to spend answering our questions? We would like to
develop these materials in cooperation with the HPES Panel.
5. Which plants should we include in this study? There is some
trade-off in the number of plants vs. the number of
respondents within each plant. We are interested in both
the differences that exist within plants, and the ways that
different types of plants may have different types and
distributions of "mental models."
6. Can the Panel participants help us to distribute materials
and collect replies?
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PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF
NUCLEAR POWER
SOME CAUSES OF LOST ACCEPTANCE
* MAJOR REACTOR ACCIDENTs
* ABSENCE OF WASTE DISPOSAL SOLUTIONS
* A STEADY STREAM OF WELL-PUBLICIZED MISHAPS,
COST OVERRUNS, MISMANAGEMENT EXAMPLES AND
ENDURING CONTROVERSY
* THE Loss, SINCE 1964, OF INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY
FIGURES IN VALIDATING NATIONAL POLICIES AND
FrMMlNGi %ON.ENSiNUS
SOME MEANS OF REGAINING ACCEPTANCE
* SUSTAINED TROUBLE-FREE OPERATION OF THE EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE U.S. AND WORLDWIDE
* DEVFiLoMENT AND DEMONSTRATION OF SAFER, MORE
EcowoiCAL NUCLEAR POWER CONCEPTS
* CGXO4SCuATION OF A BROAD SENSE OF BENEFIT FROM
NUC•LWAx PIOWER (se.g., MITIGATING EFFECI'S OF GLOBAL
WARMING., AdR POLLUTION, COAL MINING AND TRANSPORTA-
TION, DEPENJDENCE UPON IMPORTED FUELS)
* OPENING REPOSITORIES FOR HIGH AND LOW LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
GOALS OF
NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
GLOBAL GOAL
* PF~oduction of Sar, Economic Electric Power
SUBORDINATE GOALS
* Economic
* Low capital costs
o High reliability
o Low operation and maintenance costs
* Low fel ecosts
* Long lIfe
* Ease of control and diagnosis
* Safety
* Stable operation
* Reliable shutdown
* Reliabe reactor-cooling
* Reia~e containment of radioactive materials
TABLE 2
SAFETY PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT
ESSE:NTIAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS
* STABLE OPERATION
- Achieve High Mechanical Operational Reliability
o Minimize number of system failure modes and inter-
o Maximize component reliabilities
- Achieve High Human Operational Reliabilities
o Provide extensive instrumentation and computer-aided
information assessment to operators
* Automate tasks difficult for humans
* Design for easy operations, troubleshooting and
response to unexpected events
* RELABLE SHLtIOWN
- Design for Passive Negative Reactivity Feedback in Core
- Provide Diverse, Redundant, Passive Shutdown Systems
* RElABLE REACIOR COOLING
- Use Natural Convection to Pump Coolant from the
Rmactor to a Heat Sink
- C gad Radiate Heat from the Reactor to a Heat
* REL E CTAmENT OF RADIACOTVE MATERIALS
- iap Maerials in Filters, Pools, Sprays and On Exposed
Sufaces
- Retain Mat~iais Within Fuet, Reactor Coolant System
aRder Conainment Building
IMPROVING
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
CAPITAL COSTS
* Maximum Power Level
* Reduce Hardware Inventory
* Shorten Construction Duration
* Modularize the Plant
* Factory Fabrication
* Stradardize Design
* Achieve High Availability
- igh mechanical reliability
- i-gh human reliability
* Freeze Regulations and Designs Once Construction Starts
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
* Design Equipment and Plant for:
- Easy rplacement, mauinenance, repair and inspection
= Extemis e~ c nspection monitoring and diagnosis
- Substituticn d -ln mans by robots
FACTORS OF SAFETY
FREQUENCY OF OPERATIONAL DISTURBANCES
Mechanically Originated
Human Originated
Operations
Maintenance
Organizational
RELIABILITY OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Mechanical
Human
Operations
Maintenance
Organizational
ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Mechanical
Human
Procedures
Improvisations
Organizational
WORLDWIDE PROGRAMS OF
NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
* Joint European Fast Reactor (France, Germany, United
Kingdom)
* European (1400MWe?) PWR (Nuclear Power
France, Germany)
International:
Canada
* 450MWe HWR (CANDU 3) (AECL)
* 900MWe HWR (AECL & Ontario Hydro)
France
* 1400MWe PWR (N4 Project, Framatome, Electricite de
France)
* 1200(X)-145MWe LMR (Superphenix-l Project,
Electrici~ de Frace)
Novatome,
Federal Republic of Germany
* 500MWe HTGR (Successor to 300UWe THTR Project) ••pe
* 300MWe LMR (SNR 3() LMFBR Project) r.. oppt .C
* 1250MWe LWRs
ABWR (Tokyo Electric
Toshiba, Hitachi)
Power, General Electric,
APWR (Kansai Electric, Mitsubishi, Westinghouse)
* 714MWt LMR (Monju LMFBR Project)
* Successor to 148MWe FUGEN LWR/HWR Project
WORLDWIDE PROGRAMS OF
NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
United Kingdom
* 1000-1400MWe PWR (Sizewell-B, Hinkley Point-C Projects)
United States
* LWR Requirements Document Project (Electric Power
Research Institute)
* 1250MWe ABWR (General Electric)
* 1250MWe APWR (Westinghouse)
* System 80+ (ABB-Combustion Engineering)
Soviet Union
* Emphasis upon Passive Safety
100MWe Modular HTGR OtSA,
Chernobyl-Type RBMK Reactor Series Discontinued)
* Emphasis upon Economic Performance
950MWe PWR (•VY gA /O )
1250MWe LMR (LMFBR Type)
ABBREYIVATONS
Boiling Water Reactor
Canadian Deuterium Uranium, Heavy Water Reactor
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor
Heavy Water Reactor
Liquid MetalCooed Fast Breeder Reactor (version of LMR)
Liquid Metal-Cooled Reactor
Light Water Reactor
Process Inherent Ultimately Safe (venion of LWR)
hnwer Reactor Inherent Safe Modular (version of LMR)
,lreseswed Water Reacir
Safe 'Integral Reactor ,('eion of LWR)
BWR:
CANDU:
HWLR
LM FBR:
LMR:
LWR:
PIUS:
PRISM:
PWR:
SIR:
. I
WORLDWIDE PROGRAMS OF
NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS EMPHASIZING PASSIVE SAFETY
Federal Republic of ennmany
100MWe Modular HTGR (Siemens, Brown Boveri)(Pre,?~
United Kingdom and United States
* 300MWe Modular PWR (SIR Concept) (Rolls Royce &
ABB-Combustion Engineering)
United States
* 130MWe Modular HTGR (General Atomic)
* 130MWe Modular LMR (PRISM Concept, General Electric)
* 750MWe PIUS-BWR (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
* 6(JOMWe LWRs (Semi-Passive Safety)
SBWR (BWR, General Electric)
AP-69 (PWR, Westinghouse)
Sweden
* 500MWe PIUS-PWR (ASEA-Brown Bovri)0 .
Strengths and Weaknesses of Different
Reactor Concept Classes
Reactor Strengths
* Infrastructu exists * Vulnerable fuel
High energy coolant
Evolutionary
Passively safe
MHTGR
* Proven success record
Best understood
Recently improved
* More reliable safety
functions
* Robust fuel
* 'Itie iscales
* Complex
* Unforgiving
* Economics
* Economics
* No containmen
* Breeding
* High temperature
coolant
* Maybe waste-
consuming
* Economics
* Spent fuel processing
* Radioactive, chemical-
coolant
LWR
LMR
FACTORS OF FISSION POWER SUCCESS OR FAILURE
NECESSARY CONDITIONS:
* Economnic Perfemnmunce (Low Costs, Low Uncertainty)
Capital (cms rlct~oka costs)
Availability
Operations and Maintenance
Fuel
* Safety (Good Experience, Low Expected Risks and Low Safety Uncertainty)
Trouble-free operations
Demonstrable safety features
Comprehensive design refinenent-based upon Probabilistic Risk Assessment
to produce low accident probabilities and small expected consequences
Safety margin, defense-in-depth, containment
* Public Acceptance
Reasons for people to be interested in whether fission ipower can be done
right (e.g., global warming, coal-related envionmnental effects, reduced
reliance upon foreign fuels)
Successful safety and economic experience
Safety features which are either evident to the ,laymanior endorsed by
amharity figures
htLitutional restructuring to render global energy policies and definitive
Itioely licensing decisions
A basis for trust that both the hardware and its users will be reliable
**
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the safety and health issues relating to
the use of contract labor in the US. petrochemical industry. The study was commissioned
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) following the October 23,
1989, explosion and fire at the Phillips 66 Houston Chemical Complex in.Pasadena,
Texas. The explosion killed 23 workers and injured 232 others. This incident brought the
long-standing debate over the use of contract workers in the petrochemical industry to
the attention of national policymakers. This study was therefore designed to produce a
better factual base from which policy and practice on the use of contract workers might
be better informed.
OSHA directed that the study focus on the following issues:
* The prevalence of contractors in the petrochemical industry;
* The motivation for the industry's use of contract workers;
* The role of safety and health in the selection of contractors;
* The safety and health training experience of contract and direct-hire
workers;
* The responsibility for and methods of safety oversight of contract
employees; and,
The injury/illness experiences of contract and direct-hire employees.
As the study progressed, the strong linkages among the issues involving the use
of contract workers and safety on the one hand, and human resource and labor
management relations in the industry on the other, became apparent. Therefore, a section
of the report is devoted to an analysis of how these issues interrelate.
To aid in the design and conduct of the research, OSHA established a national
Steering Committee composed of industry, labor, contractor, and third-party experts. The
Steering Committee participated actively in all phases of the research project, including
the validation of the focal questions OSHA had specified for the research, the choice of
the industries to be inchluded, the decision to expand the study to include surveys of
employees and contractors, the choice of a sampling strategy, the efforts to obtain access
to case study sites and to encourage individual plants to provide the data requested, the
choice and wording of specific questions included in the surveys, and the review of
various draft reports of the findings. OSHA and the Office of Policy, US. Department of
Labor, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also reviewed, modified, and
approved each of the survey questionnaires prior to their administration. No effort was
made, however, to produce a consensus with the Steering Committee or OSHA on the
findings, conclusions, or recommendations reported here. Indeed, members of the
Steering Committee do not concur in some of our conclusions and recommendations.
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Therefore, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations remain the sole responsibility
of the authors of this report.
It is important to note that this study was not designed to serve as a
comprehensive examination of all the policy tools available to OSHA for monitoring or
improving safety outcomes in this industry, nor did it investigate the specific causes of
the major accidents that have occurred in the industry. In fact, the research team was
specifically instructed not to study facilities that had recently experienced major accidents
in order to avoid interfering with OSHA's investigations and any litigation that may
involve the parties to these accidents. Instead, this study of the management systems
which govern contract workers was designed to supplement standard development,
enforcement, and education activities.
Research Design and Methodology
Data were collected from four different sources: (1) a national survey of plant
managers; (2) nine plant-level case studies, (3) a survey of 600 direct-hire workers and
a parallel survey of 600 contract workers, and (4) a survey of 300 contracting firms active
in the industry. Each of these data sources has their individual strengths and limitations.
For example, the plant manager survey provides representative data from which we can
generalize about safety and health practices. However, because contractor injury statistics
are not routinely kept on a site-specific basis, the plant manager survey did not produce
the data needed for a reliable comparison of direct-hire and contractor injury experiences.
The case studies provide in-depth, qualitative data on how these issues are
currently being addressed in a small number of plants and thereby provide the
contextual detail that cannot be obtained through survey research. Yet, as in all case
study research, one must be careful not to generalize solely from the cases to the entire
industry. Instead, the case research provides examples, llustrations, and deeper
understanding of the policies in actual practice and the views of different parties at the
workplace on these issues.
The employee surveys provide upward feedback data from those closest to these
issues at the workplace. The surveys provide data on the injury experiences of workers,
their views on how policies and practices are implemented, a human resource profile of
direct-hire and contract workers, and perceptions and views that influence worker
behavior. Yet there is no means of randomly sampling either direct-hire or contract
workers from the populations of workers employed in the industry. Thus, we again must
be cautious in making generalizations to the overall industry from these data alone.
The contractor survey adds the supplien• voice to the data base and thereby
provides the best source on the expectations these frms see placed on them by the plants
that employ them. But because there is no known population of contractor firms, we
again cannot guarant that the data gathered from those surveyed are fully
represntative of the distribution of practices of contractors in the industry. To the extent
the sample drawn are biased, we believe they oversample those firms and employees
that are covered by more comprehensive safety and health practices and possibly those
firms with better than average safety performance records. The primary evidence for this
view is that we have oversampled the larger plants and firms in the industry, and we
consistently find that larger plants and firms have more comprehensive safety policies
and lower injury rates than smaller organizations.
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Despite thae limitations, these data are the most comprehnsive and complete
body of information ever gathered on these issues in this industry and, taken together,
save as a rich body of information for policy-making purposes. Indeed, we observed a
high degree of consistency in the responses and results generated from the different data
sources. This consistency strengthens our confidence in the results, conclusions, and
recommendations derived from this research.
Thus, the conclusions drawn from the research are based on the composite of
information gathered from these four different data sources. We believe that, taken
together, these are the broadest and most comprehensive data ever gathered from an
industry for the purposes of analyzing this set of safety issues.
Guide to Different Reports
We encourage readers to review in more detail the separate reports that provide
a detailed account of the methodology and results of the different components of the
study. Separate reports are available from OSHA on the plant manager survey, the case
studies, the direct-hire and contract worker surveys, and the contractor survey. This
report integrates these data and provides the basis from which our conclusions and
recommendations are drawn. Those who wish to go directly to a more detailed summary
of the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations are directed to Chapter 11
of this final report.
Principal Findings
Lack of Adequat Injfury and Incident Data. Current data reporting procedures
do not capture the full range of injury and illness experiences in the industry because the
injury statistics do not include the experiences of contract workers. Moreover, the existing
injury reporting system does not provide an adequate data base for capturing those
events that are most proximate to events that may lead to catastrophic accidents such as
near misses, fires, and explosions that do not result in on-the-job injuries. Existing data
are not adequate to support analyses of root causes of incidents at the plant level and,
therefore, are of limited value for preventive or problem solving purposes.
Pm falnce of Contract Workers. Contract workers account for a reported 32
percent of the workhours performed during non-turnaround periods and 54 percent of
the workhours during turnaround periods. Seventy-three percent of the direct-hire
workers and 61 percent of the contract workers indicate they have regular contact with
each other in their workplaces. There is, however, wide variability in the use of
contractors acroa plants and across work activities. In the case studies, for example,
contract workers comprised from as low as 9 percent to as much as 44 percent of the
workforce during non-turnaround periods. In the average plant, contract workers account
for 50 perctm of the workhours performed in major renovation activities, 37 percent of
the work hours turnarounds, 22 percent in maintenance and repair, 40 percent in
specialty work, and 9 percent in operations.
Trends n .se of Contract Workers. The use of contract workers has increased in
the past five years in four of the five work areas examined. According to the plant
managers surveyed, the industry experienced a net increase in the use of contractors of
19 percent in renovation, 14 percent in tunarounds, 3 percent in maintenance, and 20
,percent in specialty work. A seven percent net decrease was reported in the use of
contractors for operations. Moreover, the case study evidence suggests that the five-year
increase is part of a much longer trend toward a growing use of contract workers that
dates back more than a decade.
Human Resouce Profile of the Contract and Direct-Hie Wororfore. Compared
to the sample of direct-hire workers, contract workers are, on average, younger, less
educated, less experienced in the petrochemical industry and with their employer, lower
paid, and more likely to be of Hispanic origin. The case studies also found that contract
workers are more likely to have English language or communications difficulties.
Contract workers also receive less safety training than direct-hire workers, are less likely
to be unionized or covered by a labor-management safety and health committee, and less
likely to participate in safety discussions with others on their work site.
Role of Safety i• Contractor Selection. There is wide variability in the extent to
which safety issues are taken into consideration in selecting contractors. Plant managers
report that 38 percent of employees in the industry work in plants that have no formal
procedure for considering safety in the contractor selection process. In their survey, 34
percent of the contractors report submitting information on their safet3 and health
programs as part of the selection process, 40 percent submitted OSHA injury statistics for
either their overall company, and 63 percent submitted Workers' Compensation
Experience Modification Rate (EMR) statistics. Contractors reported that the primary
factor determining whether these data were submitted is whether the plant requires them
as part of the bidding or qualification process. Larger plants and contractors bidding on
larger projects were more likely to include these data in the selection process than smaller
plants or bids on smaller projects. Two case study plants had extensive procedures for
checking the validity of these data and examining in more detail the quality of the
contractor safety proSrams prior to selecting contractors.
Safety Training of Contract Worker The primary responsibility for safety
training for contract workers lies with the. contractor. The data from all the different
sources indicated that, on average, contract workers receive less safety training than
direct-hire workers. This finding applies to both pre-work or initial training received
when contract workers come on a work site and ongoing annual safety training as
measured by the annual hours reported in the plant manager and employee surveys. It
is recognized that any general comparisons of the amount of training provided workers
with different levels of risk exposure may be misleading. However, contract workers in
general, and the contract workers in our sample, were foundto be performing some of
the more risky and hazardous work in these plants, such as major renovation,
tunround, and maintenance work. Moreover, after controlling for differences in the
type ofwork performed the data from the employee surveys indicate that the training
contract workers receive is less effective in reducing the probability of injury than the
training received by direct-hire workers. Thus, we conclude that both the amount and the
quality of safety training provided contract workers are lower than the amount and
quality of safety training provided direct-hire workers doing similar work.
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General Managensest Oversight and M tring Systems. The method and extent
of oversight used to monitor contract workers varies widely acrom the industry. For this
reason we Included In our analysis a list of different management procedures used to
monitor and control contract workers. The list was developed from the practices
suggested by the Business Roundtable's 1982 study of contract safety performance and
from OSHA's requirements for participation in its Voluntary Protection Program. Our
analysis found that the more of these practices plants follow, the lower their direct-hire
worker iniury rates. (The lack of reliable data on site avecific contractor iniury rates
makes it impossible to adequately test for an association between use of these practices
and contract worker injury rates). We interpret this as evidence that a comprehensive
management approach - or one that develops a strong "safety culture" - produces better
safety performance.
One factor that limits how much oversight plants provide is concern over the
potential liabilities associated with co-employment. The majority of firms in the industry
advise their plant managers to avoid responsibilities for training and supervising the
contract labor force or for setting the conditions of their employment in order to avoid
whatever legal and financial responsibilities would be incurred if the plant was found to
be a co-employer of the contract workers. Concern over this issue results in creating what
we conclude is an artificial and dysfunctional boundary between the more comprehensive
safety management systems governing the average direct-hire worker and the less
comprehensive systems governing the average contract worker.
Direct-Hiria and Contract Worker Injury Comparisons. The data collected from
plant managers proved to be inadequate to compare the injury experiences of direct-hire
and contract workers. Less than half of the plant managers could supply injury rate data
for contract workers and those data that were supplied were found to be unreliable, Le.,
they were unrelated to any plant management practices and were not correlated with the
injury rates of direct-hire workers in the plant.
Data collected from the employees did provide a basis for analyzing the
probability of injuries of the two groups. From these data we concluded that contract
workers are more likely to experience accidents than direct-hire workers. Some of this
may be due to differences in the nature of the work performed since a higher proportion
of contract workers are employed in maintenance and renovation work and those
involved in these two work activities have higher probabilities of accidents than those
working in other types of work activities in these facilities. Some of the difference in
accident probabilities may also be due to differences in experience and the amount of
training reported between the direct-hire and contract workers. That is, direct-hire
workers have longer tenure with their employers and receive more safety training than
contract workers. The accumulated training and experience has the effect of reducing
accident probabilities for direct-hire workers but not for contract workers.
LabonManagemnet Relations. During the course of the study we observed that
the overall labor-management relations climate in the industry and the human resource
and labor relations practices at the plant level were closely intertwined with issues of
safety management and the use of contract workers. In short, the highly adversarial and
traditional nature of labor relations observed in this industry serves to limit the potential
for constructive negotiations and problem solving on safety and bealth issues. Moreover,
the traditions built into the US. labor relations system inhibit problem solving across the
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boundary of the employer and employee organizations that represent direct-hire
employees and contract workers in the union and non-union sectors.
At the plant level, the same separation of labor relations from safety and health
issues impedes direct and open discussion of the decisions surrounding the use of
contract workers and perpetuates a climate of uncertainty, distrust, and lack of
communication particularly in unionized plants.
The traditional vehicle that has been used to provide and employee voice on
safety issues has been the labor-management committee. Labor-management safety and
health committees are widespread in the industry, numbering 85 percent among plant
managers surveyed, but vary widely in their activity levels and effectiveness. We do find,
however, that the presence of an active labor management committee that is integrated
into an overall safety management system is associated with lower direct-hire injury
rates. Moreover, employees rate labor-management safety committees as being more
effective than unions per se in improving safety. These committees were also found in
work sites where employees reported significantly higher levels of communication on
safety issues and lower fear of reprisal for raising safety concerns. Contractors were more
likely to provide data on their safety performance in the bidding process in plants where
safety committees were active. Thus, the traditional, adversarial labor-management
relations system in this industry does not contribute to improved safety outcomes.
However, where labor and management work together in joint activities, more positive
outcomes are achieved.
Direct Employe InUolvement. Employee involvement on safety and health issues
appears to be more common among direct-hire than contract workers, but is only in the
early stages of development. Therefore, we cannot draw any firm conclusions from the
effects of these Innovations to date.
Emergng Innovations and Model Practices. Various firms and industry groups
have recently (particularly following the Phillips accident and the commissioning of this
research project) accelerated their efforts to develop stronger guidelines for training and
monitoring contract workers. However, most of these are still in their formative stages
of development. Moreover, few if any of these involve employees or their representatives
in their design or development. Thus, the pattern of unilateral and separate managerial
initiatives remains the norm.
Throughout the study we emphasize the range of variation in managerial practices
with respect to contract workers. At one end of this continuum lies a mumber of plants
that take a very active and comprehensive approach to the management of contract
worker safety. In our case studies we refer to one such plant as a "model" since it sets the
benchmar for stateof-the art practice in our sample and perhaps for the overall
indusry We see the practices of this plant, and perhaps others that follow equally
compna••-•ve practice that may lie outside of our case study and survey samples as
servin a potentially useful role for organizational learning in the industry. However, to
make thi learning effective and to translate this learning into innovations that are
appropriate in different settings and facilities, several barriers to diffusion of innovative
practices need to be overcome.
Barries to Diffsion of Innovations. Significant barriers to diffusion of
benchmark or best practices and other innovations exist in the industry. These include
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the lack of consensus among labor, manragemnt, and government over what constitutes
best practices models; the adversarial nature of labor-management relations that limitsjoint approaches to these issues; the constraints of co-emplyment liabilities; and the lack
of an adequate institutional infrastructure for learning from best practice models and
diffusing these models, particularly from the larger, more innovative firms to the smaller
firms that lack the professional and perhaps financial resources to innovate on their own.
Recommendations
Our recommendations are broadly aimed at accident prevention through the
following three objectives: (1) to improve the data base needed for root cause analysis,
problem solving and policy evaluation; (2) to diffuse innovations that are emerging in the
industry more widely and thereby reduce the variability in practices and outcomes
observed, (3) to break out of the cycle of separation of safety, human resource and labor
issues by developing joint initiatives that involve all the primary stakeholders in the
effort to improve safety and avoid risk of catastrophic accidents. The reconmmendations
therefore call for action at the national level with OSHA and other relevant agencies of
the federal government taking the lead, at the top levels of individual firms and union
organizations that are necessary to break the cycle of declining human resources and
deteriorating labor-management relations, at regional levels where new training and
workforce preparedness activities are needed, and at the level of individual plants where
the practices take place.
A complete discussion of our recommendations can be found in Chapter 11 of the
final report. They are:
1. The secretary of labor should convene a national task force of industry leadership
- corporate and labor - to jointly address safety and health in the petrroemical
industry.
2. OSHA should work with management and labor to create a collaborative,
compreensive, proactive data collection system.
3. OSHA should develop methods to identify and promote experimental and
demonstration projects that test and diffuse best practice models across the
industry ensuring the involvement of all legitimate stakeholders.
4. OSHA should establish and implement safety and health training standards for
all petrochemicad industry employees.
5. Management and labor represwntaties of the petrochemical andconractor
industri should develop strategies to reverse the declining human resource
prfi ine this industry.
6. OSHA shoud require plant management to amume esponsiility for the safety
and health of all workers - direct-hie and contract - at the ork site.
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7. OSHA should reqire the es tablishment of eff atiarbor m-nagemrw t afety and
health committes that include ?presentatip of contract workrs at ach
petrochemical work site and provide reource to train committee members in
committee activities.
8. Plant managers should engage their worforkoce and labor representatives in open
discussion of the contract dedsion-ma~ ng process.
9. OSHA should review the criteria and management of the Voluntary
Protection Program as it pertains to the management of contract employees.
10. The Congres should charge the General Accounting Office with
responsibility for the review of the conduct, the findings, and the
conclusions of this study.
11. OSHA should continue the research and emluation process.
12. The Departmet of Labor and OSHA should determine the degree of incrsed
appropriations necessary to respond to the recommendations of this study and
should diligently seek such funding.
Our report ends by sketching two possible future scearia for the industry and
its workforce. The first assumes the key parties involved in these issues - government,
management, and labor.- choose to reject or ignore the findings and recommendations
and allow current conditions and recent trends to continue. The second scenario assumes
the parties act on the information and recommendations provided here. We Invite the
readers to examine these two scenarios and decide which better serves the workers,
firms, and communities affected by the risks inherent in the petrochemical industry and
how they are managed.
Chapter U
CONCLUSIONS
AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Taken together, the case study, plant manager, direct-hire and contract worker,
and contractor surveys strengthen our understanding of the implications of the use of
contract labor for safety and health practices in the US. petrochemical industry. Each of
the components of the study has strengths and weaknsses, but when combined they
provide a comprehensive basis for formulating policies to improve safety and health
practices in this industry. Moreover, the data collected from these different parties
genrally reveal a consistent pattern of results. Relatively few instances were found
where the data reported are contradictory in direction, although some estimates of the
magnitude of practices or problems differ somewhat among respondents to the surveys.
The surveys also reveal serious weaknesses in the existing data and information
base available to those responsible for identifying and preventing safety problems. An
important part of our recommendations will therefore focus on how to improve the
collection and analysis of safety and health data in this industry.
This chapter will present a brief summary and review of the principal fndings
of this research and outline the policy recommendations we draw from this work. As we
will note throughout this chapter, we believe that the data collected in this study should
serve as the beginning of a continuous and collaborative effort to understand and act on
the critical safety and health issues in this industry. These recommendations will have
their greatest potential for reducing hazards in this industry if the government,
management, and labor representatives who share responsibility for safety issues engage
these data in a problem-solving fashion, and use them to design improvement strategies
to which they are fully committed. As will become evident, we are recommending that
all parties - government, management, and labor - adopt a more proactive, preventive,
and collaborative approach to reducing the risks of accidents and injuries. We believe it
essential that these three parties put aside their differing agendas to focus on the
counon interest of improved workplace safety and health in the petrochemical industry.
We should note one iportant feature of our results. All the survey and case
study data reveal a wide diversity of safety and health practices and outcomes in this
industry. This diversity has both benefits and costs. On the one hand, the variation
allowed us to tt and to affirm that a significant, positive relationship exists between the
enprhensivelvm of tafety and health practices in a facility and safety performance, a
correlation that othen before us have also observed and reported (Business Roundtable,
1982). Moreover, close examination of the facilities with the most comprehensive and
effective practices provided a dclear picture of a current "state-of-thet" or "best practice"
model that can serve a a benchmark for the rest of the industry. On the other hand, the
existence and pesistence of wide variation in practices suggests there are significant
barriers to the diffusion of stateof-the-art practices that need to be overcome if the
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overall risk of accidents and injuries is to be reduced. Thus, we see the recognition of the
severity of safety and health problems in this industry, the adoption of a best-practice
model for the safety management of contract workers, and the diffusion of this best-
practice or benchmark model as the key policy objectives for the parties. Our
recommendations are designed to further these objectives.
By taking this approach we do not imply that a single "best way" to manage
safety and health can or should be applied in all settings. Instead, we use the "best
practice" model in the same way that organizations now use what is called in practice
"competitive benchmarking" or in other circles "organizational learning" (Cohen and
Sproull, 1991; Kochan and Useem, 1991). That is, we seek to encourage all the parties of
interest to search out the information needed to compare their current practices to those
judged to be the current "state of the art," to analyze the applicability of these practices
to their own setting, to experiment with those practices believed to apply and to adopt
others where appropriate to fit their unique conditions, and to evaluate the results. It is
this type of learning and experimentation that fosters informed diffusion and innovation
that, if widely communicated and shared among all the stakeholders in the industry, can
foster continuous innovation and improvement. We believe that the data and analysis of
practices presented in this report provide a starting point for this type of learning and
diffusion process.
,
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